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Abstract
Aerosol generating procedures (AGPs) may expose health care workers (HCWs) to pathogens causing acute respiratory
infections (ARIs), but the risk of transmission of ARIs from AGPs is not fully known. We sought to determine the clinical
evidence for the risk of transmission of ARIs to HCWs caring for patients undergoing AGPs compared with the risk of
transmission to HCWs caring for patients not undergoing AGPs. We searched PubMed, EMBASE, MEDLINE, CINAHL, the
Cochrane Library, University of York CRD databases, EuroScan, LILACS, Indian Medlars, Index Medicus for SE Asia,
international health technology agencies and the Internet in all languages for articles from 01/01/1990 to 22/10/2010.
Independent reviewers screened abstracts using pre-defined criteria, obtained full-text articles, selected relevant studies,
and abstracted data. Disagreements were resolved by consensus. The outcome of interest was risk of ARI transmission. The
quality of evidence was rated using the GRADE system. We identified 5 case-control and 5 retrospective cohort studies
which evaluated transmission of SARS to HCWs. Procedures reported to present an increased risk of transmission included
[n; pooled OR(95%CI)] tracheal intubation [n=4 cohort; 6.6 (2.3, 18.9), and n=4 case-control; 6.6 (4.1, 10.6)], non-invasive
ventilation [n=2 cohort; OR 3.1(1.4, 6.8)], tracheotomy [n=1 case-control; 4.2 (1.5, 11.5)] and manual ventilation before
intubation [n=1 cohort; OR 2.8 (1.3, 6.4)]. Other intubation associated procedures, endotracheal aspiration, suction of body
fluids, bronchoscopy, nebulizer treatment, administration of O2, high flow O2, manipulation of O2 mask or BiPAP mask,
defibrillation, chest compressions, insertion of nasogastric tube, and collection of sputum were not significant. Our findings
suggest that some procedures potentially capable of generating aerosols have been associated with increased risk of SARS
transmission to HCWs or were a risk factor for transmission, with the most consistent association across multiple studies
identified with tracheal intubation.
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Introduction
Heath care workers (HCWs) are at constant occupational risk
for many infectious diseases transmitted from ill patients, despite
existing safety protocols [1]. During the severe acute respiratory
syndrome (SARS) outbreaks, many frontline HCWs had a
significantly increased risk of contracting the SARS-coronavirus
(SARS-CoV) that resulted in severe illness and death [2]. Although
clinical guidelines and protective measures for the management of
patients with acute respiratory diseases exist, the magnitude of the
risk of acquiring an infectious disease through some patient care
procedures is not clearly understood [3,4].
Procedures that are believed to generate aerosols and droplets as
a source of respiratory pathogens include positive pressure
ventilation (BiPAP and CPAP), endotracheal intubation, airway
suction, high frequency oscillatory ventilation, tracheostomy, chest
physiotherapy, nebulizer treatment, sputum induction, and
bronchoscopy [5–7]. Although those procedures are known to
stimulate coughing and to promote the generation of aerosols,
their risk of transmission of infection is not known with certainty. It
is worth emphasizing that the scientific evidence for the creation of
aerosols associated with these procedures, the burden of potential
viable microbes within the created aerosols, and the mechanism of
transmission to the host have not been well studied. It is unclear
whether these procedures pose a higher risk of transmission and
whether HCWs caring for patients undergoing the aerosol
generating procedures are at higher risk of contracting the
diseases compared to HCWs caring for patients not undergoing
these procedures.
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 April 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 4 | e35797Prolonged exposure and poor infection control compliance,
such as poor hand-washing, may be associated with an increased
risk of occupationally acquired infection [8,9]. Inadequate spacing,
and the ineffectiveness of personal protective equipment may also
contribute to nosocomial transmission [4]. There is some evidence
that training programs and the use of personal protective
equipment are associated with a decreased risk of transmission
of SARS [10]. For instance, with proper control measures in three
key areas (including staff personal protection, categorization of
patients to stratify risk of SARS transmission, and reorganization
of the operating room), high risk aerosol generating procedures
(surgical tracheostomy) performed on SARS patients appeared to
be associated with a low risk to HCWs who were in direct contact
with the patients in the operating room [11].
While there appears to be a lack of high quality evidence
regarding the risk of transmission of acute respiratory infections
from aerosol generating procedures, the current evidence-based
guidelines [5–7,12–17] recommend additional infection control
measures be taken for specified aerosol generating procedures
performed on patients with suspected respiratory infection. These
additional infection control measures include performing aerosol
generating procedures in a single room with a minimal number of
personnel present; using the most qualified personnel to perform
the aerosol generating procedures; and requiring the use of
personal protective equipment, specifically facial mask, full
waterproof gown, face shield or goggles, and gloves. Many of
these guidelines provide recommendations based on expert
opinion and little understanding of the actual risk of transmission
associated with the aerosol generating procedures.
We therefore sought to systematically review the literature on
the risk of transmission of acute respiratory infections to HCWs
exposed to patients undergoing aerosol generating procedures
compared with the risk of transmission to HCWs caring for
patients not undergoing aerosol generating procedures, as
specified in the existing literature [5–7]. The review did not
address the generation of aerosols from specific procedures, the
presence of viable microbes responsible for acute respiratory
diseases within aerosols which may have been created by specific
procedures, and the risk of transmission of Mycobacterium tuberculosis.
Methods
A protocol for the systematic review was written a priori.
Literature search
Peer reviewed literature searches were conducted to obtain
published literature for this review. All search strategies and search
terms were developed by an information specialist with input from
the authors. The following bibliographic databases were searched
through the Ovid interface: MEDLINE, MEDLINE In-Process &
Other Non-Indexed Citations, EMBASE, CINAHL. Parallel
searches were run in PubMed, Cochrane Library (Issue 10,
2010), LILACS, Indian Medlars and Index Medicus for South
East Asia. The search strategy was comprised of both controlled
vocabulary, such as the National Library of Medicine’s MeSH
(Medical Subject Headings) and keywords. Methodological filters
were applied to limit the retrieval to health technology
assessments, systematic reviews, meta-analyses, randomized con-
trolled trials, non-randomized studies, and guidelines. Detailed
search strategies are available from the CADTH website (http://
www.cadth.ca/media/pdf/
M0023__Aerosol_Generating_Procedures_e.pdf). Accessed 2012
Mar 30.
The search included all languages and was limited to articles
published between Jan 1, 1990 and Oct 22, 2010. Conference
abstracts were excluded from the search results. Regular alerts
were established on EMBASE, MEDLINE, CINAHL and
PubMed, and information retrieved via alerts was current to Jan
15, 2011.
Grey literature (literature that is not commercially published)
was identified by searching the websites of health technology
assessment and related agencies, professional associations, and
other specialized databases. Google and other Internet search
engines were used to search for additional information. These
searches were supplemented by hand searching the bibliographies
and abstracts of key papers, and through contacts with appropriate
experts and agencies.
Selection criteria
Eligible studies included health technology assessments (HTAs),
systematic reviews, meta-analyses, randomized controlled trials,
and non-randomized studies. The study population involved
HCWs caring for patients with acute respiratory infections. The
intervention was the provision of care to patients undergoing
aerosol generating procedures (exposed to the procedures). The
comparator was the provision of care to patients not undergoing
aerosol generating procedures (unexposed to the procedures). The
outcome of interest was the risk of transmission of acute
respiratory infections from patients to HCWs. Procedures that
might promote the generation of droplets or aerosols (non-
exhaustive list) included non-invasive ventilation (CPAP and
BiPAP), endotracheal intubation, airway suctioning, high frequen-
cy oscillatory ventilation, bag-valve mask ventilation, chest
physiotherapy, nebulizer therapies, aerosol humidification, bron-
choscopy or other upper airway endoscopy, tracheotomy, and
open thoracotomy.
Article selection
Two reviewers (KT and KC) independently applied the
selection criteria and screened all citation titles and abstracts that
were retrieved from the literature search. The full texts of articles
selected by either reviewer were obtained. The reviewers then
independently reviewed the full text articles and selected studies
for inclusion. The included and excluded studies were compared
and any differences between reviewers were resolved by consensus.
An independent third reviewer was available to determine final
study selection in instances where consensus could not be reached.
However, there were no studies that required consultation with a
third reviewer to determine whether they fit the inclusion criteria.
Data extraction and analysis
Relevant data from each of the individual studies were extracted
by one reviewer (KT) and verified by a second reviewer (KC) using
the predesigned data extraction form to capture the study
characteristics and the outcome of interest. The study character-
istics included information about the origin of the study, the period
of evaluation, the population, types of laboratory tests to confirm
the diseases, and assessment of training and protection equipment
use. The outcome of interest was the risk of transmission of acute
respiratory infections from patients to HCWs. Any disagreements
between reviewers were resolved by consensus. An independent
third reviewer was available to determine final data extraction in
instances where consensus could not be reached. However, there
were no data elements extracted that required consultation with a
third reviewer to determine accuracy. Where appropriate, study
results were pooled in a meta-analysis. The appropriateness of
pooling of data was determined based upon the degree of clinical
Aerosol Generating Procedures
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heterogeneity was found, sensitivity analysis on treatment effect
was conducted. The majority of aerosol generating procedures
were evaluated in one study, which precluded the need for
pooling. Data analysis was performed using Review Manager
Software using a random effects model [18]. Effect sizes were
reported as odds ratio (OR) and its 95% confidence interval (CI).
A GRADE evaluation of the quality of evidence was performed
[19].
Results
The literature search identified a total of 1,862 publications. Of
those citations, 1,776 were excluded after screening of titles and
abstracts, and 86 were retrieved for full-text screening. Ten
publications were included in this report, and the remaining 76
articles were excluded (Figure S1). The reasons for exclusion were
an inappropriate study design, intervention, comparator, or
outcome, and inappropriate patient population.
Ten non-randomized studies were identified, including five
relevant case-control studies [20–24] and five retrospective cohort
studies [25–29]. One study [22] was published in Chinese
language and was translated by a CADTH researcher. No
relevant systematic reviews, meta-analyses, or randomized con-
trolled trials were identified.
Study characteristics
The study characteristics (risks of transmission of an acute
respiratory infection) and assessment of quality according to
GRADE are shown in Table 1. All 10 studies investigated the
protective measures or the risk factors for transmission of SARS-
CoV from patients to HCWs in hospital or intensive care unit
settings during the 2002–2003 SARS outbreaks. Four studies were
carried out in Canada, [25–27,29] one in Singapore, [23] and five
in China [20–22,24,28]. Six studies [20–22,24–26] included more
than 100 HCWs (ranging from 122 to 758), and four studies
[23,27–29] included less than 100 HCWs (ranging from 43 to 86).
Doctors, nurses, residents, therapists, technologists, housekeepers,
and others were among HCWs in eight studies, [20–26,29] while
one study included only nurses [27] and the other included only
medical students [28]. Most studies assessed whether HCWs had
proper infection control training or wore personal protective
equipment while caring for patients with SARS. The SARS cases
were confirmed by various laboratory tests for the presence of
antibodies against SARS-CoV.
Quality assessment
The results of GRADE (Grading of Recommendations
Assessment, Development and Evaluation) categorized all ten
studies [20–29] as providing very low quality evidence (http://
www.cadth.ca/media/pdf/
M0023__Aerosol_Generating_Procedures_e.pdf). Accessed 2012
Mar 30.
Outcomes
Table 2 shows the risks of SARS transmission to HCWs exposed
and not exposed to AGPs, and AGPs as risk factors for SARS
transmission.
Four cohort studies [25–27,29] showed that HCWs performing
or being exposed to a tracheal intubation procedure had a higher
risk of disease transmission compared with unexposed HCWs
(Table 2). A summary estimate (using a random effects model) for
the cohort studies yielded an OR of 6.6 (95% CI 2.3, 18.9) with
moderate statistical heterogeneity (I
2=39.6%) (Figure 1). Four
case-control studies [20,21,23,24] identified that tracheal intuba-
tion was a significant risk factor for transmission of SARS to
HCWs (Table 2). A summary estimate (using a random effects
model) for the case-control studies yielded an OR of 6.6 (95% CI
4.1, 10.6) with high statistical heterogeneity (I
2=61.4%) (Figure 2).
Exclusion of an outlier study (Teleman [23]) from the summary
estimate yielded an OR of 8.8 (95% CI 5.3, 14.4) with no statistical
heterogeneity (I
2=0%). In three of the case control studies,
[20,21,24] the authors reported tracheal intubation as an
independent risk factor for acquisition of SARS based on results
obtained using multivariate analysis.
One case-control study [22] reported that the combination of
four procedures which were evaluated together (intubation,
tracheotomy, airway care, and cardiac resuscitation) was a risk
factor with an OR of 6.2 (95% CI 2.2, 18.1) estimated from
multivariate analysis. This combined analysis was derived from the
same data set as that of Liu et al., 2009, [24] but was based on a
clinical diagnosis of SARS. Other aerosol-generating procedures
either reported as a risk factor or with an increased risk of
transmission for SARS among HCWs included non-invasive
ventilation from two cohort studies (OR 3.1; 95% CI 1.4, 6.8),
[25,26] tracheotomy in one case-control study (OR 4.2; 95% CI
1.5, 11.5), [20] and manual ventilation before intubation from one
cohort study (OR 2.8; 95% CI 1.3, 6.4) [25]. These two latter
procedures were not found to be independently associated with an
increased risk of SARS transmission in the two studies that
performed multivariate analysis.
Two cohort studies [25,27] reported some risks associated with
nebulizer treatment exposure, while another cohort study [28]
showed otherwise. The latter study by Wong et al. (2004) [28]
showed that medical students performing bedside clinical
assessment had an increased risk of SARS infection even before
nebulizer therapy was used. This study did not assess the training
for infection control measures among medical students, which may
be a source of bias and thus the study may yield a different result
compared to the cohort studies by Loeb et al.(2004) [27] and
Raboud et al. (2010) [25]. A summary estimate of those three
studies yielded an OR of 0.9 (95% CI 0.1, 13.6) with high
statistical heterogeneity (I
2=73.1%). In a sensitivity analysis,
exclusion of the data of Wong et al. (2004) [28] from meta-analysis
yielded an OR of 3.7 (95% CI 0.7, 19.5) with no statistical
heterogeneity (I
2=0%).
Pooled estimates suggest that activities such as chest compres-
sions (cardiopulmonary resuscitation), [25,27] suction before
intubation, [25,27] suction after intubation, [25,27] manipulation
of oxygen mask, [25,27] bronchoscopy, [25,27] insertion of
nasogastric tube, [25,27] and defibrillation [25,27] might be
associated with an increased risk of transmission, but the odds
ratios were not statistically significant. Chest compressions from
one case control study [24] were found to be a risk factor for
transmission, but this finding was in contradistinction to the
findings from the pooled estimate from two cohort studies, which
did not find a significantly increased risk of transmission [25,27].
For procedures such as manipulation of BiPAP mask, [27]
endotracheal aspiration, [27] suction of body fluids, [23]
mechanical ventilation, [25] manual ventilation, [27] manual
ventilation after intubation, [25] high-frequency oscillatory
ventilation, [26] administration of oxygen, [23] high-flow oxygen,
[25] chest physiotherapy, [25,27] and collection of sputum sample,
[25] the point estimates showed no significant difference.
Aerosol Generating Procedures
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Our findings suggest that some procedures potentially capable
of generating aerosols have been associated with increased risk of
SARS transmission to HCWs, with the most consistent association
across multiple studies identified with tracheal intubation.
Tracheal intubation may require HCWs to be in close proximity
to a patient’s airway for prolonged periods of time and the
association of transmission of SARS-CoV in this setting would be
biologically plausible. The strength of the association is supported
by the observation that 7 of the 8 studies revealed that HCWs
performing or being exposed to a tracheal intubation had a higher
risk of SARS-CoV transmission compared to unexposed HCWs.
In addition, the one study in which this observation was not
consistent was considered as an outlier and, when removed from
the random effects model for transmission, the degree of
heterogeneity, as measured by the between-studies variance,
dropped from 49.1% to 15.9%. In a random-effects model, the
between-studies variance or I
2, reflects how much the true
population effect sizes differ from single studies of a meta-analysis
[30]. The finding of relatively low heterogeneity with removal of
the one outlier study provides a certain degree of confidence in the
observation, given the consistency of the finding.
Other associations observed from the systematic review
included non-invasive ventilation (two studies) and manual
ventilation before intubation and tracheotomy, each from single
studies. These findings were identified from a very limited number
of studies and the data from these studies were not considered
sufficiently robust to establish the risk of transmission with any
certainty, in contrast to the consistent findings from multiple
studies associated with tracheal intubation. Among 20 other
potential aerosol generating procedures identified, none were
found to be significantly associated with a risk of SARS
transmission.
We acknowledge there were a number of limitations within the
study. Although the methodologies and results of the included
studies differed, overall the evidence from the 10 included studies
was of very low quality according to GRADE. In general,
limitations in design and imprecision are issues in all studies that
led to the very low rating. Furthermore, all of the included studies
Table 1. Characteristics of included studies
Study;
Country Design/Setting
Period of
evaluation Population
Assessment of training
and protective
equipment? Laboratory tests
Study
quality
(GRADE)
Raboud
et al,
2010 [25]
Canada
Retrospective cohort
study; Multiple hospitals
2003 SARS outbreak
in Toronto
624 HCWs
(physicians, residents,
nurses, therapists,
technologists,
housekeepers, others)
Yes Culture and PCR for
SARS-CoV
VERY LOW
Chen et al,
2009 [20]
China
Case-control study;
Hospital
2003 SARS outbreak
in Guangzhou
758 HCWs
(doctors, nurses, health
attendants, technicians,
others)
Yes ELISA for antibody against
SARS-CoV
VERY LOW
Liu et al,
2009 [24]
China
Case-control; Hospital 2003 SARS outbreak
in Beijing
477 HCWs
(medical staff, nursing
staff, others)
Yes ELISA for antibody against
SARS-CoV
VERY LOW
Pei et al,
2006 [21]
China
Case-control study;
Three hospitals
2002–2003 SARS
outbreak
in Beijing and Tianjin
443 HCWs
(doctors, nurses,
technicians,
administrators, others)
Yes Not mentioned of methods
to detect antibodies against
SARS-CoV
VERY LOW
Fowler et al,
2004 [26]
Canada
Retrospective cohort
study; Intensive care unit
2003 SARS outbreak
in Toronto
122 critical care staff
(physicians, nurses,
nursing assistants,
respiratory therapists,
others)
No, on training All
HCWs wore gloves,
gowns, N-95/PCM 2,000
masks, and hairnets. Eye and
face shields were variably
employed
PCR or serology for
SARS-CoV
VERY LOW
Loeb et al,
2004 [27]
Canada
Retrospective cohort
study; Intensive care unit;
Coronary care unit
2003 SARS outbreak
in Toronto
43 nurses Yes Serology,
immunofluorescence
VERY LOW
Ma et al,
2004 [22]
China
Case-control study;
Five hospitals
2003 SARS outbreak
in Beijing
HCWs
(nurse assistants, janitors
and others) (N=473)
Yes Diagnostic criteria for SARS
from Chinese Minister of
Health
VERY LOW
Teleman et
al,
2004 [23]
Singapore
Case-control study;
Hospital
2003 SARS outbreak
in Singapore
86 HCWs
(doctors, nurses, others)
Not mentioned Symptoms, chest X-ray and
serology
VERY LOW
Wong et al,
2004 [28]
China
Retrospective cohort
study; Hospital
2003 SARS outbreak
in Hong Kong
66 medical
students
Yes, on personal protection
equipment
No, on training
Indirect immunofluorescent
to detect antibodies against
SARS-CoV
VERY LOW
Scales et al,
2003 [29]
Canada
Retrospective cohort
study; Intensive care unit
2003 SARS outbreak
in Toronto
69 intensive
care staff
Unclear Radiographic lung infiltrates VERY LOW
CoV: coronavirus; HCWs: health care workers; PCR: polymerase chain reaction; SARS: severe acute respiratory syndrome.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035797.t001
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Procedures as Risk Factors for SARS Transmission
Aerosol Generating Procedures Odds ratio (95% CI)
Point estimate Pooled estimate; I
2
Tracheal intubation (4 cohort studies) 3.0 (1.4, 6.7) [25] 6.6 (2.3, 18.9); 39.6%
22.8 (3.9, 131.1) [26]
13.8 (1.2, 161.7) [27]
5.5 (0.6, 49.5) [29]
Tracheal intubation (4 case-control studies) 0.7 (0.1, 3.9) [23] 6.6 (4.1, 10.6); 61.4%
9.2 (4.2, 20.2) [21]
8.0 (3.9, 16.6) [20]
9.3 (2.9, 30.2) [24]
Suction before intubation (2 cohort studies) 13.8 (1.2, 161.7) [27] 3.5 (0.5, 24.6); 59.2%
1.7 (0.7, 4.2) [25]
Suction after intubation (2 cohort studies) 0.6 (0.1, 3.0) [27] 1.3 (0.5, 3.4); 28.8%
1.8 (0.8, 4.0) [25]
Nebulizer treatment (3 cohort studies) 6.6 (0.9, 50.5) [27] 0.9 (0.1, 13.6); 73.1%
0.1 (0.0*, 1.0) [28]
1.2 (0.1, 20.7) [25]
Manipulation of oxygen mask (2 cohort studies) 17.0 (1.8, 165.0) [27] 4.6 (0.6, 32.5); 64.8%
2.2 (0.9, 4.9) [25]
Bronchoscopy (2 cohort studies) 3.3 (0.2, 59.6) [27] 1.9 (0.2, 14.2); 0%
1.1 (0.1, 18.5) [25]
Non-invasive ventilation (2 cohort studies) 2.6 (0.2, 34.5) [26] 3.1 (1.4, 6.8); 0%
3.2 (1.4, 7.2) [25]
Insertion of nasogastric tube (2 cohort studies) 1.7 (0.2, 11.5) [27] 1.2 (0.4, 4.0); 0%
1.0 (0.2, 4.5) [25]
Chest compressions (1 case-control study) 4.5 (1.5, 13.8) [24]
Chest compressions (2 cohort studies) 3.0 (0.4, 24.5) [25] 1.4 (0.2, 11.2); 27.3%
0.4 (0.0**, 7.8) [27]
Defibrillation (2 cohort studies) 0.5 (0.0**, 12.2) [27] 2.5 (0.1, 43.9); 55.3%
7.9 (0.8, 79.0) [25]
Chest physiotherapy (2 cohort studies) 1.3 (0.2, 8.3) [27] 0.8 (0.2, 3.2); 0%
0.5 (0.1, 3.5) [25]
High-frequency oscillatory ventilation (1 cohort study) 0.7 (0.1, 5.5) [26]
High flow oxygen (1 cohort study) 0.4 (0.1, 1.7) [25]
Tracheotomy (1 case-control study) 4.2 (1.5, 11.5) [20]
Intubation, tracheotomy, airway care, and cardiac resuscitation
(1 case-control study)
6.2 (2.2, 18.1) [22]
Manipulation of BiPAP mask (1 cohort study) 6.2 (2.2, 18.1) [27]
Endotracheal aspiration (1 cohort study) 1.0 (0.2, 5.2) [27]
Suction of body fluid (1 case-control study) 1.0 (0.4, 2.8) [23]
Administration of oxygen (I case-control study) 1.0 (0.3, 2.8) [23]
Mechanical ventilation (1 cohort study) 0.9 (0.4, 2.0) [25]
Manual ventilation before intubation (1 cohort study) 2.8 (1.3, 6.4) [25]
Manual ventilation after intubation (1 cohort study) 1.3 (0.5, 3.2) [25]
Manual ventilation (1 cohort study) 1.3 (0.2, 8.3) [27]
Collection of sputum sample (1 cohort study) 2.7 (0.9, 8.2) [25]
BiPAP: bi-level positive airway pressure; CI: confidence interval.
*actual value is 0.01;
**actual value is 0.02.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035797.t002
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generalizable to other acute respiratory pathogens, including
influenza virus. As well, with the exception of tracheal intubation,
there were a limited number of studies identified for each
procedure, which limits the confidence for an individual
observation. In addition, there is difficulty in identifying the
specific part of a given procedure, which may be complex and
involve several manoeuvres that impart the greatest risk of
transmission. There are likely differences which exist related to
the degree of infectious aerosol generation associated with various
procedures and the actual risk of transmission. We also
acknowledge that the findings presented may have been influenced
by direct and indirect contact transmission even though this route
of transmission should have been minimized with the use of
personal protective equipment. We were unable to exclude non-
compliance with the use masks, gloves, and gowns during the
procedures which were performed, but consider it unlikely that
health care workers would use no precautions.
Seven out of 10 studies conducted the investigation at only one
hospital, which could increase the risk of selection bias and limit
the generalizability of the results. Four studies included less than
100 patients. The number of HCWs included in the studies, who
were exposed to the aerosol generating procedures, was small,
ranging from 2 to 120. The sample size of the studies could
potentially bias estimates of effects and limit statistical power.
Related to this, the number of events was small in a number of
studies. As noted in the results, for a number of potentially aerosol
generating procedures (bronchoscopy, [27] non-invasive positive
pressure ventilation, [26] manipulation of BiPAP mask, [27] and
insertion of nasogastric tube [27]) point estimates suggested an
increased risk, but confidence intervals were wide and were not
statistically significant. Not all HCWs caring for SARS patients
were included in the studies, since there were some HCWs who
refused to participate in the interview process as outlined in the
individual studies. HCWs’ recall might be imperfect, thus
generating recall bias if some were more complete or more
accurate than others. Since the source of transmission (i.e.,
primary, secondary, or tertiary cases) was sometimes unclear, it is
difficult to accurately determine if HCWs were infected directly or
indirectly from the index patients.
The estimated risk of transmission of infection through aerosol
generating procedures in the included studies could have been
confounded by the medical characteristics of the patients, the level
of infection control training, and compliance with the use of
effective personal protection methods among HCWs. Among the
included studies, five [20–22,24,25] reported that infection control
training and personal protective measures are effective against the
nosocomial spread of SARS. These factors might also contribute
to the spread of the viral pathogens, in addition to the aerosol
generating procedures themselves.
Any conclusions drawn from this systematic review must be
interpreted with caution, given the number and quality of the
identified studies. However, the evidence included in this review,
considered to be of very low quality based on GRADE, does
suggest that some procedures potentially capable of generating
aerosols have been associated with an increased risk of SARS
Figure 1. Risk of SARS Transmission to HCWs Exposed to Tracheal Intubation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035797.g001
Figure 2. Tracheal Intubation as Risk Factor of SARS Transmission.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0035797.g002
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procedures that were assessed, performing or being exposed to a
tracheal intubation appeared to be most consistently associated
with transmission of SARS Co-V. While other procedures,
including tracheotomy, non-invasive ventilation, and manual
ventilation before intubation were associated with an increased
risk of SARS infection, given the paucity of studies and lack of
robustness, these findings were considered difficult to interpret
with respect to drawing firm conclusions. There were no other
procedures which were found to be significantly associated with a
risk of SARS transmission.
Despite the comprehensive nature of the search, the limitations
of the included studies serve to emphasize the lack of high quality
studies which have examined the risk of transmission of microbes
responsible for acute respiratory infections to HCWs caring for
patients undergoing aerosol generating procedures. In addition,
the findings serve to highlight the lack of precision in the definition
for aerosol generating procedures. Further, the results of this
report should not be generalized to all acute respiratory infections
because the evidence available is strictly limited to SARS. A
significant research gap exists in the epidemiology of the risk of
transmission of acute respiratory infections from patients under-
going aerosol generating procedures to HCWs, and clinical studies
should be carefully planned to address specific questions around
the risks of transmission in these settings. Given the importance to
policymakers with respect to guidelines and barrier precautions for
the protection of HCWs who are providing care for patients who
are undergoing aerosol generating procedures, a priority should be
established by funding agencies, health care organizations, and
governments to foster high quality research in this area.
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